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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a Third District Court decision 
finding the statute providing for filing fees for candidates for 
public office unconstitutional because it denied Equal Protection 
of the Law and has the effect of making a property requirement to 
be a candidate for public office. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Judge Dean E. Conder, Third District Court, held §20-3-14 
Utah Code Annotated to be unconstitutional under Article I, 
Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and ordered that the 
appellants (William Hoyle and Bruce Bangeter) names be placed on 
the ballot. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to have the Lower Court Judgment upheld. 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
The parties Stipulated to the qualification of William Hoyle 
and Bruce Bangeter to be candidates for U. S. Congress from Utah 
except for the payment of a filing fee. The respondent Hoyle had 
paid the filing fee into the Court pending the resolution of the 
issues in this case. Bruce Bangeter filed an Affidavit of Impe-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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cuniosity which was rejected by the appellent in as much as there 
was no statutory provision to waive the filing fee based on 
impecuniosity. 
The parties furthermore stipultated that for the purposes of 
this case, the respondents were impecunious in as much as there 
were no standards by which to measure that status. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
IN AS MUCH A UTAH LAW PROVIDES FOR NO PROCEDURE TO BE 
NAMED AS A CANDIDATE ON A BALLOT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE WITHOUT PAYING 
A FILING FEE, THERE IS A PROPERTY REQUIREMENT TO RUN FOR OFFICE 
AS PROHIBITED BY ARTICLE I SECTION 4 AND ARTICLE IV, SECTION 7 OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
THEREFORE, SECTION 20-3-14 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Article I, Section 4 and Article IV, Section 7 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah each prohibit a property 
requirement for voting or holding political office. 
Article I, Section 4 states: 
" •••• No property qualification shall be required of any 
person to vote, or hold office, except as provided in this 
Constitution." Respondent has found no exceptions (since Article 
- 2 -
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IV, section 7 was amended, a point not acknowledged by appellants 
brief,) in Utah's Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment provi-
des that no State shall pass any laws that denies ff ••• to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
The challenged statute violates all of the cited constitu-
tional prov is ions. Sec ti on 20-3-14 Utah Code Annotated states: 
Any candidate filing a nomination paper or 
acceptance as provided in this act shall pay 
to the filing officer a fee for such filing. 
The fee to be paid shall be one fourth of one 
per cent of the total salary for the full 
term legally or customarily paid by such 
office to the person holding the same, but 
such fee shall not be less than $5.00, except 
filings for all precinct offices shall be 
$1 .00. No filing fees shall in any event be 
returned to the candidate. 
Regardless of Point II of appellants brief, the Utah 
Legislature has required that a candidate for the offices 
recieving the least amount of compensation have at least property 
in the value of one dollar. If a person desires to run for the 
United States Senate, he must have property in an amount close 
to Eight Hundred Dollars ($800 .00). This discrimination was one 
issue presented to, but not decided, by the District Court. 
Never-the-less, if the inability of a person to pay a filing fee 
Prevents a person from being a candidate for office, there is a 
Property requirement ff to hold off ice. ff 
- 3 -
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In 1966 the United States Supreme Court in the case of 
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections 383 U. S. 663, 16 L, 
ed 2d 169, 86 S. Ct. 1079 (1966) declared it to be a denial of 
Equal Protection of the law for the State of Virginia to charge a 
poll tax before exercising the right to vote by its citizens. 
The stated as follows: 
We conclude that a State violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
whenever it makes the affluence of the voter 
or payment of any fee an electoral standard. 
Votes qualifications have no relation to 
wealth nor to paying or not paying this or 
any other tax. id., 16 L. Ed 2d at p. 172 
Furthermore, the amount, regardless how small is not accep· 
table. 
We say the same whether the citizen, other-
wise qualified to vote, has $1.50 in his 
pocket or nothing at all, pays the fee or 
fails to pay it. The prinicple that denies 
the State the right to dilute a citizen's 
vote on account of his economic status or 
other such factors by analogy bars a system 
which excludes those unable to pay a fee to 
vote or who fail to pay. id., 16 L. Ed 2d at p. 173 
That case set the standard which prohibited economic 
requirements restricting access to the ballot. 
In Kraner v. Union Free School District 395 U. S. 621, 231 · 
Ed 2d 583, 89 S Ct. 1886 (1969). The Court struck down a voter 
- 4 -
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qualification which restricted voters in such elections to, among 
other things, "Property owners or leasers of taxable real 
property" in the School Board District. The Court required the 
State of New York to show a "Compelling State interest" why the 
discrimination was necessary. That same standard has not been 
met by the State of Utah here. 
The Court in the case of Builock v. Carter 405 U. S. 134, 
31 L. Ed 2d 92, 92 S. Ct. 849, (1972) in striking down a Texas 
law which exacted filing fees from candidates for public office, 
which amounts were set by the Political parties, and included 
some relationship to the expected emoluments of the office. The 
statute placed the financing burden of primary elections on the 
political parties and, in most instances, the primary election 
us determinative of the final election. 
The Bullock Court was concerned with the burden on can-
didates rather than on the right to vote directly. But upon 
deciding that any restrictions on the access of a candidate to 
the ballot, the voters rights were restricted in some degree. 
Unlike a filing-fee requirement that most 
candidates could be expected to fulfill form 
their own resources or at least through 
modest contribution,s the very size of the 
fees imposed under the Texas system gives it 
a patently exclusionary character. Many 
potential office seekers lacking both per-
sonal wealth and affluent bakers are in every 
practical sense precluded from seeking the 
- 5 -
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nomination of thier chosen party, no matter 
how qualified they might be, and no matter 
how broad or enthusiastic their popular 
support. The effect of this exclusionary 
mechanism on voters is neither incidental nor 
remote. Not only are voters substantially 
limited in their choice of candidates, but 
also there is the obvious likelihood that 
this limitation would fall more heavily on 
the less affluent segment of the community, 
whose favorites may be unable to pay the 
large costs required by the Texas system. 
Id • 31 L. Ed 2 d At p. 1 0 0 • 
The Court found that since the exhorbitant filing fees in 
that state affected voters choices. The standards of Harpuv. 
Virginia Board of Elections, supra. and Kramer v. Union Free 
School District, supra. must be met by the state in upholding 
discrimimatory laws. That is, 
Because the Texas filing-fee scheme has a 
real and apreciable impact on the exercise of 
the franchise, and because this impact is 
related to the resources of the voters sup-
porting a particular candidate. Bullock, 
3 1 L . Ed 2 d at p • 1 0 0 • 
Finally, in the case of Lubin v. Panish 415 U. S. 709, 3~ 
L. Ed. 2d 702, 94 S. Ct. 1315 (1974). The Court struck down a 
California law that had no provision for indigent candidates 
having access to the ballot. The Court specifically rejected 
the rationale advanced by the State of Utah. While recognizin! 
that preventing "laundry list ballots" as being a legitimate 
- 6 -
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State interest, that reason did not meet the strict scrutiny 
required to limit ballot access. The Court stated: 
This legitimate state interest, however, must 
be achieved by a means that does not 
unfairly or unnecessarily burden either a 
minority party's or an individual candidate's 
equally important interest in the continued 
vailability of political opportunity. The 
~terests involved are not merely those of 
parties or individual candidates; the voters 
can assert their preferences only through 
candidates or parties or both and it is this 
broad interest that must be weighed in the 
balance. The right of party or an individual 
to a place on a ballot is entitled to protec-
tion and is intertwined with the rights of 
voters. Id. 39 L. Ed 2d at p. 708. 
Futhermore, the appellants agrument regarding control of the 
ballot ws not pursuasive to the Lubin Court. 
A large filing feem may serve the legitimate 
function of keeping ballots manageable but, 
standing alone, it is not a certain test of 
whether the candidacy is serious or spurious. 
A wealthy candidate with not the remotest 
chance of election may secure a place on the 
ballot by writing a check. Merchants and 
other entrepreneurs have been known to run 
for public office simply to make their names 
known to the public. We have also noted that 
prohibitive filing fees, such as those in 
Bullock can effectively exclude serious can-
didates. Conversely, if the filing fee is 
more moderate, as here, impecunious but 
serious candidates may be prevented from 
running. Id. at p. 709. 
- 7 -
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Consequently, the rationale advanced by the appellant in our case , 
will not meet Federal Constitutional Standards. Surely, Ut~ 
should be desirous of encouraging the broadening of the vot~o 
0 
oppotunities of its citizens rather than making them more 
restrictive. 
The State of Utah has advanced no original argument to show 
that the deficiencies of 20-3-14 Utah Code Annotated are excus-
ab 1 e under the cited U. S. Supreme Court cases • The agrument 
that there is equality between write in candidates and those with 
names printed on the ballot is specious and petty. The concepts 
of equal time in the press, simple news coverage and the proble1 
of name identificatio.n are all realities where a write-in can-
didate would be at a disadvantage. 
Most importantly, the State of Utah has advanced no argument 
upon which this Court could conclude that the exclusion of an 
impecunious provision is based on a rational need. In fact, they 
have made no attempt whatever to rationalize the deficiency in 
the Statute. They, not the respondents, must show this Court 
that the District Court errored in its "close Scrutiny of the 
Law" or that it wrongfully concluded the omission was 
"reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of a legitimate 
State objective". They have not done so. 
Nothing respondent advances here suggests a filing fee, 
- 8 -
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where it is legitimatly based, and the potential candidate can 
so pay, is prohibited. 
CONCLUSION 
seciton 20-3-14 Utah Code Annotated denies Equal Protection 
of the Laws as required by the Fourteenth amendment to the United 
States constitution and places a property requirement on holding 
office as prohibited by Article I, Section 4 and Article IV, 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. And there is no legitimate 
state objective that is rationally based which is fulfilled by 
the deficiency. 
- 9 -
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HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief wu 
hand delivered to Robert B. Hansen at the Attorney's General 
Office, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake Ctiy, Utah 8414, on 
this ___ _ day of April, 1979. 
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